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In a booklet written in 1740 the Neapolitan mathematician Pietro Di Martin0 contested the 
opinion, shared by the most important scholars, that Fermat had deduced the same refrac- 
tion law as Descartes from an opposite hypothesis on the velocity of light. He also denied 
that from falsehood, truth could be deduced by a direct demonstration. At the same time Di 
Martin0 stated a minimum principle for optics that was consistent with Newton’s theory and 
identical to the principle of least action stated by Maupertuis in 1744. However, Di Martin0 
did not extend his principle to dynamics but restricted it to optics because, unlike the French 
scientist, he did not look for final causes but for simple laws which provided a reasonable 
explanation of physical phenomena. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
11 matematico napoletano Pietro Di Martino, in un opuscolo de1 1740, contesto l’opinione 
comune the Fermat avesse dedotto la stessa legge di rifrazione di Descartes pur partendo da 
un’ipotesi opposta sulla velocita della lute. Egli affronto anche ii problema se da1 falso si 
possa dedurre il vero mediante una dimostrazione diretta. Di Martin0 stab& per l’ottica, un 
principio di minim0 the era in accord0 con la teoria newtoniana e sostanzialmente identico 
al principio di minima azione di Maupertuis. Di Martin0 pet-b, al contrario di Maupertuis, 
non lo estese alla Meccanica perch2 piuttosto the per cause finali propendeva per leggi 
fisiche semplici in grad0 di dare spiegazioni razionali dei fenomeni. o 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
Der Neapolitanische Mathematiker Pietro Di Martin0 bestritt in einem kleinen Werk von 
1740 die von den wichtigsten Gelehrten vertretene Meinung, Fermat habe dasselbe Bre- 
chungsgesetz wie Descartes mit Hilfe einer entgegengesetzten Hypothese tiber die Licht- 
geschwindigkeit abgeleitet. Er best&t ebenso, dal3 aus etwas Falschem die Wahrheit mit 
Hilfe eines direkten Beweises abgeleitet werden konne. Gleichzeitig stellte Di Martin0 ein 
Minimumprinzip fur die Optik auf, das mit Newtons Theorie vereinbar war und mit dem von 
Maupertuis 1744 aufgestellten Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung iibereinstimmte. Di Martin0 
tibertrug jedoch sein Prinzip nicht auf die Dynamik, sondern beschrankte es auf die Optik, 
da er anders als die franzosischen Wissenschaftler nicht nach finalen Ursachen, sondern 
nach einfachen Gesetzen suchte, die eine verniinftige Erklarung der physikalischen Er- 
scheinungen lieferten. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Fermat-Descartes controversy could be considered closed at the beginning 
of the 18th century, despite the apparent unawareness of the majority of scientists 
of the contradictory hypotheses and results of the two theories. 
Kirsti Andersen, in her analysis of the mathematical technique of Fermat’s law 
of refraction [Andersen 19831, has addressed the question of what prevented 
Fermat from recognizing that his law was different from that of Descartes. 
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The aim of our paper is to discuss a booklet [Di Martin0 17401 written by Pietro 
Di Martin0 (Naples, 1709-1746) on the difference between the hypotheses and 
results of Descartes and Fermat. The discussion of such a difference between the 
two laws leads Di Martin0 to address an important epistemological question: 
namely, whether truth can be deduced from falsehood by a direct demonstration. 
In Di Martino’s view, attempts to derive the same physical law from opposite 
hypotheses have logical support only under this condition. His objective is to 
deny that this is possible. In order to help the reader to place Di Martino’s 1740 
booklet in the proper context, we summarize in Section 1 the contents of the 
booklet, together with those of a physics handbook written by the same author [Di 
Martin0 17381, as well as Di Martino’s strategy. In Section 2 we describe the most 
relevant arguments concerning optics discussed by Di Martin0 in his 1738 hand- 
book, while in Section 3 we discuss Di Martino’s resolution of the Fermat-Des- 
cartes controversy. Finally, in Section 4 we state our conclusions. 
1. DI MARTINO’S 1738 HANDBOOK AND 1740 BOOKLET 
The Philosophiae naturalis institutionurn libri tres by Pietro Di Martin0 was one 
of the best handbooks of Newtonian physics printed in Italy, at essentially the 
same time as the publication of the well-known commentary of Jacquier and Le 
Seur (Geneva, 1739-1742). The aim of its author was to present Newton’s dy- 
namics, astronomy, and optics, and to underline the deep link between the experi- 
mental aspects of the Opticks and the theoretical ones of the Principia. The 
handbook, in fact, starts underlining that mathematics and physics, as reason and 
experience, are connected by “very close bonds” [“arctissimis vinculis coniunc- 
tis’ ‘1. 
The Sectio tertia of the first volume (Chaps. 3-8, pp. 261-310) is devoted to 
optics. Di Martin0 follows Newton’s text, apart from some significant differences, 
as discussed in Section 2 below. In particular, Di Martin0 accepts Newton’s 
opinion that light travels faster in denser media and, as a consequence, he ends the 
chapter on refraction (pp. 283-285) by censoring Fermat’s principle. After the 
book was sent to the printer, however, further reflections on this argument appar- 
ently led him to state a new minimum principle for refraction that was consistent 
with Newton’s hypothesis. This principle is essentially the same as the one enun- 
ciated a few years later by Maupertuis and known as the principle of least action. 
He therefore hastened to write a preface to the book, “Monita quaedam ad lec- 
torem,” where he proves Fermat’s “error” in a different way from that in the 
text, and announces: 
In fact I found that a minimum principle for refraction can be 
velocity, or from space & time or finally from time & velocity 
derived either space & 
Since Newton’s hypothesis on the speed of light in matter was the same as 
Descartes’ (and therefore opposite to Fermat’s), and since it was the common 
(although mistaken) view that Fermat had found the same refraction law as Des- 
cartes, it is easy to understand Di Martino’s strategy in presenting his finding in 
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his 1740 booklet. Rather than emphasizing the discovery of his minimum princi- 
ple, the Neapolitan mathematician preferred to discuss the decidability of the 
Fermat-Descartes controversy. Without this, it would have been in fact impos- 
sible to explain rationally how the same empirical truth (i.e., Snell’s law) could be 
accounted for by two theories deriving from opposite hypotheses. 
This strategy is evident both in the structure of the booklet and in the accompa- 
nying letter to Francesco Maria Zanotti, Secretary of the Bologna Accademia 
delle Scienze [ 11: 
Even though this letter is addressed to V. S. Ill.ma, I wish it to be shared by you and all 
Academicians of this very respected Institute, to whose careful scrutiny I submit the attached 
small philosophical dissertation on the refraction and motion of light rays, in which I have 
endeavoured to examine, and also decide, the famous controversy debated during the past 
century between two rare French geniuses, Descartes and Fermat. You will see that I have 
written with great liberty, and that with great liberty I have pointed out the errors of many 
very renowned mathematicians concerning this question. I wish, therefore, that this Institute 
gives to me the same liberty that I have given to others, amending and correcting all that will 
appear not to be true. Moreover, I beg you in particular, and your appreciated nephew Sig. 
Dr. Eustachio to read it carefully, to see if the reflections I have made on the said questions 
are tenable. 
Anyone familiar with Di Martino’s intellectual biography will not be surprised by 
the content and tone of this letter. To write “with great liberty,” to confront 
himself with the great “mathematicians,” and to enter the relevant scientific 
debates are certainly parts of his mental attitude, as we have shown in the case of 
his intervention in the living forces controversy [Indorato & Nastasi 19871. 
The tone of the letter shows clearly that Di Martin0 is convinced that he has not 
only discussed and decided a problem of physics (formulating his minimum princi- 
ple), but more than that he has touched on the related epistemological aspects that 
were at the center of the Italian debate on the introduction of the Newtonian 
synthesis. Thus, his 1740 booklet is to be regarded, using his own words, as “a 
small philosophical dissertation. ” Di Martino’s stated aim was, in fact, to discuss 
the problem of refraction also from an epistemological point of view. Accordingly, 
the book ends with a revealing final paragraph: “How did Fermat succeed in 
deriving truth from false hypotheses?” 
Here the problem of physics is linked to the retrograde motion of the planets, 
which is only apparent (false) in the hypothesis of the moving earth, and becomes 
real (true) in the hypothesis of the earth at rest. 
To make this argument clearer to the reader, we wish to quote the beginning of 
this paragraph [Di Martin0 1740, 18-191: 
I have to explain something really singular; i.e. how could Fermat obtain the same result as 
Descartes, by following an opposite route. This might appear less strange to superficial 
people, since they think that this is usual, especially in Astronomy where celestial phenom- 
ena may be explained equally well both supposing, with Copernicus, that the Earth revolves 
around the Sun at the centre of the Universe, or supposing, with Tycho, that the Sun revolves 
around the motionless Earth. There might also be some people who, to remove the miracle, 
will maintain that it is sometimes possible in Geometry to deduce truth from falsehood by a 
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direct demonstration; see Cardano, Clavius and Tacquet on this point. It is, however, neces- 
sary to dispel this way of reasoning as futile and totally unworthy of mathematicians. First, 
the fact that in Astronomy the celestial phenomena may be derived from opposite hypothe- 
ses, does not seem a stringent argument. Copernicans, for example, believe that the retro- 
grade motions of the planets are apparent and Tychonians, on the contrary, believe them to 
be real. Therefore, even though both explain from opposite hypothesis why the planets, 
reversing every year their path, proceed toward the zodiacal signs already passed, neverthe- 
less they do not explain the same phenomenon, but very different things, Sure enough, if one 
day it will be possible to know if the retrograde motions are real or apparent, a celebrated 
question of Natural Philosophy will come to an end. Secondly, concerning the possibility of 
deducing truth from falsehood by a direct demonstration, it is a shame that such an opinion is 
largely accepted and that it is not rejected by some scholars. This is not the right place to 
examine the examples that they give, taken from Euclid, Theodosius and others, in which 
they maintain that this way of demonstrating is used. I will possibly give elsewhere a special 
demonstration. For the moment, however, I cannot refrain from deriding those who are 
convinced that the spherical shape of the sea can be deduced directly from the very hypothe- 
sis that it is not spherical. According to this argument, the parts of the sea farther from the 
centre will flow until the Earth assumes a spherical and regular shape. But, either I am 
mistaken, or what can be legitimately deduced from this hypothesis is that the sea will 
oscillate as a pendulum indefinitely and will never come to rest. Their deduction is therefore 
false, as the hypothesis from which it is derived. From this example, it is obvious that from 
falsehood it is possible only to derive falsehood, using sound reasoning. 
We have quoted this long passage in order to underline clearly Di Martino’s aim: 
to show that it is impossible to deduce the same experimental physical law (for 
example, Snell’s law) starting from two opposite hypotheses, such as the ones of 
Fermat and Descartes on the velocity of light in a medium. 
As shown by the example of the retrograde motions, Di Martin0 also wanted to 
assume a new stand in the debate concerning the possibility of verifying experi- 
mentally a theoretical hypothesis. He was clearly against those [Generali 1986,211 
who tended to reject any astronomical hypothesis, not only the Ptolemaic, in 
favor of an empirical methodology and of a strictly observational astronomy. 
This was, for instance, the position held by Di Martino’s teacher, the Bolognese 
astronomer Eustachio Manfredi who, in the introduction to his astronomy hand- 
book [Manfredi 1749, x] wrote: 
It takes a long time to ascertain the facts, and a longer one to place them into a theory, and 
even if at the end all the facts were found to be well described by the theory, this would not 
confirm the theory, because it is possible that the same facts could derive from different 
causes unknown to us, even if equivalent. Therefore, it is not convenient to submit Astron- 
omy to hypotheses that, once taken as the foundation of our reasoning, could lead us into 
error. 
Di Martin0 was aware that the debate on this subject had been going on for a very 
long time. Even if he does not explicitly quote Kepler, the reader cannot help 
recall the well-known passage of the Mysterium cosmogruphicum in which Kepler 
took a stand against the interpretation that limited astronomical theories to mathe- 
matical models apt to “save the phenomena.” As is Kepler [Westman 1975,714- 
7151, Di Mar-tin0 is critical of the claim that a true conclusion could be obtained 
from false premises by the rules of syllogism. Anyone accepting this could be 
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forced to the conclusion that an experimental physical law is compatible with 
contradictory hypotheses. Di Martino, quoting Clavius and Tacquet, scoffs at this 
way of reasoning, which is today known as “Clavius’ law” [Gardies 1984, 981 or 
also as “consequentia mirabilis” (under this name “it appears to have acquired a 
certain popularity among Jesuit scholars” [Lukasiewicz 1970, 1681). 
Clavius’ Law was well known to Di Martino: even if he does not quote its 
original and powerful usage [Emch 19351 made by Saccheri in his Logica demon- 
strativa [ 16971 and in the Euclides ab omni naevo vindicatus [1733], Di Martin0 
was aware of its usage as a method of demonstration “equally scientific and that 
gives the same certitude as the others” (aeque scientificus net minorem pariat 
certitudinem, ac reliqui) in Jacob Bernoulli’s Theses Zogicae [Bernoulli 1686,279] 
and in the Elementa geometriae planae [Napoli 17291 of his brother Nicola. 
Di Martino, however, also seems to be aware that the consequentia mirabilis 
had always met with strong opposition; for example, we recall the objections of 
the German Cartesian Daniel Lipstorp [2] to the Jesuit Tacquet [Tacquet 1754, 
308-3 121, and the debate in the Port Royal School (Arnauld Nicole and Pascal) on 
reasoning by abduction [Gardies 1984, 98-1061. 
We think that Di Martin0 is wrong in deriding Tacquet’s arguments and in 
denying any validity of Clavius’ law, but we have quoted his passage above 
because we think that it contains, in germ, a serious objection to Tacquet’s extrap- 
olation of Clavius’ law. In fact, the implicit and explicit steps in the demonstration 
of the sphericity of the sea surface are the following: (1) suppose that at time t the 
surface of the sea is not spherical; (2) suppose that, as shown by experience 
(Tacquet), liquids flow downward; (3) suppose that the liquid is viscous (this 
hypothesis is not stated by Tacquet, and lightly rejected by Di Martino); it follows 
that, after a long enough time at, the surface of the liquid must necessarily assume 
a spherical shape (the motion is in fact oscillatory, but damped). In any case, 
however, this argument proves that the surface of the sea is spherical at time t + 
6t if it was not spherical at time t, and not Tacquet’s contention that it is spherical 
at time t. Di Martino’s denial of Clavius’ law was rather disrupting: Fathers 
Jacquier and Le Seur kindly asked for more arguments on the subject: “The 
proposition that one cannot derive truth from a false hypothesis seems to us to 
deserve from you a dissertation, because the matter is important, and many skill- 
ful philosophers and mathematicians, among them Mr. Wolff, have an opposite 
opinion” (quotation from [Di Martin0 174 1, 641). 
Boscovich’s reaction, on the contrary, was very rash [Boscovich 1741, 4-6; 
Boscovich 1745, passim]: he accused Di Martin0 of having gratuitously dispelled 
what was, in his opinion, one of the most significant results of the Jesuit tradition 
of logic (Clavius, Tacquet, and Saccheri). Boscovich, however, was badly mis- 
taken when he accused him of not having given the physical explanation of the 
constancy of the tangent component of the velocity of light in refraction. Still in 
1748,2 years after Di Martino’s death, Boscovich, in his De fumine, again pointed 
out this “omission,” even sharing Di Martino’s criticism of Fermat and Leibniz 
[Boscovich 1748, 371. 
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On the other hand, Boscovich’s self-censorship in his early papers is well 
known [Casini 1983, 143-581. As an example of this necessary caution, we can 
consider the debate on the shape of the earth. Being aware that the Newtonian 
thesis of the flattening of the poles was based on the hypothesis of the spinning of 
the earth around its own axis, Boscovich held that Newton’s thesis could also be 
explained from a Ptolemaic point of view. 
2. PHYSICAL OPTICS IN PIETRO DI MARTINO’S 1738 HANDBOOK 
As we have tried to point out, Pietro Di Martin0 assumes that phenomena and 
experiments are powerful and necessary tools to explain the basic principles of 
physics. As a consequence he derives the common properties of light from three 
main distinctive features, namely (a) light consists of a motion of matter; this 
property can be seen “with the evidence of the eyes” each time light is emitted by 
a “lucid” body, for instance, a burning one, whose “particles have an endless and 
violent motion”; (b) light follows rectilinear patterns by “very thin rays,” so thin 
that they can be considered as geometrical lines; (c) light has a finite velocity of 
propagation. 
After having stated these properties, Di Martin0 takes into consideration the 
possibility that transport of matter could be involved in the propagation of light. 
On this subject Di Martin0 shares Newton’s ideas opposing Descartes’ opinion 
that the propagation of light consisted of mere pressure without “actual motion.” 
Di Martino, however, does not share Newton’s corpuscular theory. On the 
contrary, we feel that he prefers the wave theory. In fact, he says that motion of 
the particles emitted by a lucid body can reach our eyes in two different ways (p. 
266, italic in the text): 
. . . by a motion of translation of some matter emitted by lucid bodies, as the Epicureans, 
and recently as the great Zsauc Newton thought, or by communication, in that the particles of 
a lucid body communicate their motion to the nearby matter, which makes the matter in 
contact with it vibrate and so on, until the vibration reaches our eyes. . . . It seems more 
likely to me that the motion of the particles of a lucid body reaches our eyes by communica- 
tion rather than by translation. 
In spite of great respect for Newton, we can see a refusal of the corpuscular 
theory: according to Di Martino, light is propagated through the ether, an elastic 
medium, much more elastic than air (to explain the larger velocity of light with 
respect to sound), by a mechanism according to which the particles of a lucid body 
transmit their motion to the elastic medium. Therefore it is this perturbation of the 
elastic medium that is propagated, not material corpuscles. 
In support of this theory, Di Martin0 draws an analogy with sound (see Chap. 
VIII, Sect. III, pp. 324-327), comparing colors to pitches. He felt authorized to 
draw this analogy by Newton’s statement in Queries 13 and 14 of the Opticks that 
he quotes faithfully. Di Martin0 also quotes Query 28, but he does not seem to 
have understood Newton’s objections to Huygens’ wave theory of light. Accord- 
ing to Newton a wave theory was inconsistent with the rectilinear propagation of 
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light. Huygens replied to Newton’s objections by asserting that, when light waves 
pass through an opening, the secondary waves are too weak to have any sensible 
effect. Newton counters that it was not clear why the same argument could not 
apply to sound as well. 
As already stated, Di Martin0 did not understand the core of the problem. He 
seems convinced that light is propagated in the ether in the same way as the sound 
in the air, i.e., by waves [Di Martin0 1738, 324-3251. It appears that he tries to 
overcome Newton’s objections to the wave theory by simply avoiding to relate 
the concept of light rays with the wave theory. He, in his handbook, never gives a 
definition of the concept of rays of light. In this way he is able to share Newton’s 
dynamical proof of the law of refraction. 
Di Martino’s explanation of refraction can be summarized as follows (Chap. IV, 
p. 271 ff.): the phenomenon of diffraction (Grimaldi, but above all Newton) sug- 
gests the idea that around each body one can suppose the existence of a very thin 
region of an “atmosphere. ” When it comes to refraction then, each one of the two 
media, because of its own “atmosphere,” will exert on the light ray a force 
perpendicular to the separating surface. The denser medium, however, will exert 
a greater force, that is to say the resultant will accelerate the normal component of 
the motion of light in the denser medium. In fact, Di Martin0 says quoting 
‘scravesande [3], it is well known from experience that there is no refraction 
between media of equal density, and the greater the difference in density the 
greater the refraction. 
Di Martin0 points out that this model can also provide an explanation of the 
difference between the refraction of light and the refraction of material bodies. In 
passing from a rarer to a denser medium, material bodies depart from the normal, 
while the contrary is true for light. According to Di Martino, this difference in 
behavior is due to the fact that the “refraction” of material bodies is mainly 
caused by the resistance of the media, while the refraction of light is mainly due to 
the attraction exerted by the media in the thin regions of their “atmospheres.” Di 
Martin0 cautiously presents the explanation of this phenomenon as a model; for 
“if it is not true, at least it suffices to explain the phenomena of refraction” 
(paragraph No. 453, p. 278). This model may be summarized as follows: when a 
material particle or a light ray strikes the surface separating two media, two forces 
of different intensity, that is, an attractive force due to the “atmospheres” and a 
repulsive one due to the resistance of the media, arise. Both of these forces are 
proportional to the densities of the media. For a particle, the repulsive force owing 
to the resistance of the media is always greater than the attractive one owing to the 
“atmospheres.” On the contrary, for a light ray the attractive force is greater than 
the repulsive. “And this is not absurd,” Di Martin0 concludes, “in the system of 
attractions, where the attraction of the ‘lumen’ must be immense, the ‘lumen’ 
being by far the thinnest of all material particles,” It is evidence that this argument 
is very similar to that of Newton’s Query 21, where a refracting force inverse to 
the mass [4] is assumed. 
Boscovich’s criticism regarding Di Martino’s failure to give an explanation of 
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the conservation of the tangential component of velocity in the phenomenon of 
refraction is unjustified. In his 1740 booklet, in fact, Di Martin0 does not give his 
dynamical explanation of refraction, but only refers to it when quoting Proposition 
XCIV of Book I of the Principia: he simply takes it for granted, supposing that his 
interlocutor has read his 1738 handbook and, in any case, is familiar with New- 
ton’s Principia and Opticks. 
3. THE RESOLUTION OF THE FERMAT-DESCARTES CONTROVERSY 
As we have seen above, in his 1740 booklet, Di Martin0 stated a minimum 
principle consistent with the hypothesis that the velocity of light is greater in the 
denser medium. At the same time he contested the common opinion, shared by 
scientists such as Huygens, Leibniz, and Fermat himself, that Fermat had de- 
duced the same refraction law as Descartes, i.e., sin i : sin r = ur : vi (vi = velocity 
of the incident ray, u, = velocity of the refracted ray), from an hypothesis on the 
velocity of light opposite to that of Descartes. From this point of view the booklet 
is essentially historical; that is, the opinions of the protagonists of the dispute, 
starting from Fermat’s famous letter to Descartes [Fermat 1894 II, 485-4891, are 
reviewed and discussed. The question is well known and can be summarized as 
follows. Fermat did not accept Descartes’ proof of the sine law because, he said, it 
was based only on an analogy and not a true principle. Fermat believed he had 
found a true principle, because “nothing is so probable and so evident” [Fermat 
1894 II, 4601 as that “nature always acts by the shortest courses” [Fermat 1894 II, 
3541. 
Then Fermat stated his minimum principle which is equivalent to saying that the 
path of light connecting a point A and a point B is that for which the time employed 
is a minimum, even if the two points are in different transparent media. In other 
words, if the velocity of light is supposed to be a different constant in each 
medium (vi or u,) the actual path must be such that the quantity 
l/Vi * (6Si) + l/U, ’ (6Sr) 
is a minimum (where 6si and 6s, are the paths in the two media, respectively). 
Hence the sine law can be derived 
sin i : sin y = Ui : ur = constant. 
Descartes’ form was instead 
sin i : sin y = u, : Ui = constant. 
The two laws are identical only in the sense that both affirm the constancy of the 
ratio of the sines, but while the former asserts that the sines are in direct ratio of 
the velocities, the latter asserts that they are in the inverse ratio of the velocities. 
Strangely enough, Fermat disregarded the diversity, and was very surprised to 
find a law identical to that of Descartes. Since his law was consistent with experi- 
ence only if one supposes that light is faster in the rarer medium, he became even 
more convinced that Descartes’ proof was full of paralogisms [Sabra 1981, 1491. 
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Since Pietro Di Martin0 shared Newton’s theory of light, it was obvious to him 
that the velocity of light was greater in the denser medium. He therefore believed 
that Descartes’ form of the sine law was correct. It is for this reason that Di 
Martin0 proved first that Fermat’s assumption concerning the velocity of light was 
wrong [1740, Sect. II] and second that his minimum principle was false [1740, 
Sect. III]. 
According to Di Martino, since Fermat’s hypothesis on the velocity of light was 
false, no true consequence could be derived from it. Contemporary scientists had 
not realized, in Di Martino’s opinion, that Fermat had made two errors: his very 
minimum principle, and the assumption concerning the velocity of light in the 
media. These two errors, which compensated each other, had misled Fermat, and 
the Cartesians as well, to believe that Fermat’s law of refraction was the same as 
Descartes’, and therefore correct. To prove that Fermat had actually erred twice, 
it suffices, according to Di Martino, to prove that light is faster in the denser 
medium. As a consequence, the principle of least time must be false because it 
would cause a light ray, when passing, for example, from air to water, to turn 
toward the normal, which is contrary to experience. However, Di Martin0 does 
not give the dynamical proof we have sketched in Section 2, but that given by 
Descartes, which, as we know, is based on a mechanical analogy, that is, on the 
conservation of the tangential component of the velocity of light at the surface of 
separation of the two media [5]. 
Di Martin0 then considers the minimum principle proposed by Leibniz against 
Fermat’s principle of least time [Leibniz 16821. According to Leibniz, light fol- 
lowed the easiest way, i.e., a path where the “difficulty” was a minimum. More- 
over, in a homogenous medium, the “difficulty” had to be computed as the length 
of the path 6s times the “resistance” R of the medium; therefore, in the case of 
two homogenous media the relation 
Ri * 6si + R, . as, = a minimum 
should hold, and the sine law should be 
sin i: sin r = R,:Ri. 
Leibniz’s principle is therefore consistent with experience if the “resistance” of 
the denser medium was supposed to be greater than that of the rarer medium, 
which seems quite reasonable. But Leibniz assumed further, in agreement with 
Descartes, that light is faster in the denser medium. According to Leibniz, the 
greater the resistance, the greater the velocity. Di Martin0 judged this assumption 
could not be maintained because it was against any physical common sense. 
Where “resistance” is greater, by no means can velocity be greater as well. In 
fact, he objects that the greater the resistance, the smaller must be the velocity. Di 
Martin0 is convinced that light is actually more “impeded” by water than by air, 
even if it is faster in water, and he rebukes Descartes [Di Martin0 1740, 10-l 11. 
For this reason, in his 1738 handbook he tried to prove that the “atmosphere” of 
the medium, rather than its “resistance,” must be taken into account. 
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According to Di Martino, since light is faster in the denser medium, “resis- 
tance” cannot be proportional to density, but rather must be inversely propor- 
tional to density. Consequently, Leibniz’s principle was equivalent to the princi- 
ple of least time and hence erroneous [6]. 
Finally, Di Martin0 asserts his own minimum principle to be consistent with 
experience and with Newton’s theory of light. Once he ascertained that a mini- 
mum principle, in which only space, or velocity, or time was concerned, yielded 
incorrect results, he realized that he could try to minimize a combination of two 
of these quantities. Di Martino’s principle is identical to what will be known as 
Maupertuis’ principle of least action, that is 
Ui * 6Si + Ur * as, = a minimum. 
From this principle Di Martin0 derived the sine law in Descartes’ form, but by a 
different method than in the introduction to the 1738 handbook, where he gave an 
analytical proof (the same that may be found in many books on the history of 
science). In the 1740 booklet he preferred to give a “synthetic” proof. We shall 
omit both of them for the sake of brevity. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In 1744 Maupertuis stated the principle of least action in a paper entitled “The 
Agreement between the Different Laws of Nature That Had, until Now, Seemed 
Incompatible” [Maupertuis 17531. Maupertuis’ aim was to state a principle, con- 
sistent with Newton’s theory and valid both for light and material bodies. 
Actually his minimum principle, one stated for light, in which case it is wrong, 
was extended, rather arbitrarily, into dynamics where it was successful. It is 
unlikely that Maupertuis was aware of Di Martino’s 1740 booklet when stating his 
principle, but it is a matter of fact that his principle of least action is similar to the 
minimum principle of the Neapolitan mathematician. Furthermore, Di Martino’s 
and Maupertuis’ memoirs are very similar in this historical treatment and they had 
the same aim: to look for a minimum principle compatible with Newton’s theory, 
which they were advocating. Both rejected Fermat’s principle of least time, using 
almost the same words, asserting that it could not be maintained because light is 
faster in denser media. However, unlike Maupertuis, Di Martin0 shares the wave 
theory of light. Moreover Di Martino’s scientific works do not have those meta- 
physical aspects which permeate Maupertuis’ thought. While Maupertuis rebuked 
those scientists who wanted to bar final causes from the laws of Nature, Di 
Martin0 was rather pragmatic and looked for simple laws that were logically 
consistent and supplied a reasonable explanation of physical phenomena. It is for 
this reason that Di Martin0 did not attach any peculiar significance to the quantity 
[m] . u l s, while Maupertuis claimed that 
it is the quantity of action which 
possible in the motion of light. 
is Nature’s true and which she as much as storehouse, spares 
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The metaphysical nature of his principle, and therefore its universality, enabled 
Maupertuis to extend it into mechanics, a step that was not possible for Di Mar- 
tino, for the reasons we have tried to make clear. 
On the other hand, owing perhaps to the peculiar historical and cultural Italian 
milieu, it was the epistemological aspect of the controversy which mainly inter- 
ested Di Martino. If the same “truth” could be derived from two opposite hypoth- 
eses, no certainty could be reached in natural philosophy, no general principle 
could be stated, and only simple experimentalism would have been possible. 
Supporters of this point of view could use the Fermat-Descartes controversy to 
strengthen their position. Di Martin0 thought that his “resolution” of the dispute, 
i.e., that Fermat’s and Descartes’ laws were actually different, would have 
blunted this weapon of his adversaries. 
Di Martino’s epistemology is certainly naive, but we feel that his attempt to 
blend together physics, mathematics, and logic, in a framework in which natural 
philosophy acquired the dignity of a rational science, deserves to be pointed out. 
This is in fact one of the few Italian attempts in this direction that we are aware of. 
NOTES 
1. In Archives of the Academy of Sciences 
Zanotti,” fast. 5. The letter is dated 1740. 
of Bologna, Titolo III, p. II, “Lettere missive di F. M. 
2. On Lipstorp, professor at the University of Ltibeck and author of the Specimina philosophiae 
cartesianae, quibus accedit (. . .) Copernicus rediuiuus (Lugduni Batavorum: Elzevier, 1653), cf. 
[Mouy 1934, 97-98, 184-1851. 
3. Cf. [‘sGravesande 1748 II, 745-7461: “then there is no refraction if the two media have equal 
density; and the refraction is greater, the greater the difference between the two densities.” With 
regard to this notion of atmosphere, clearly derived from the Dutch physicist, Di Martino’s point of 
view was very similar to Clairaut’s, apart from the corpuscular hypothesis. Compare, for example, Di 
Martino’s explanation with the analogous paragraph of the important paper of [Clairaut 17411. 
4. About the difficult formulation of this Query, cf. [Hall 1978, 187-1911. 
5. We think it is due to the fact that Di Martin0 took the thesis for granted, that he gave the simplest 
proof. His aim, as we said, was not to prove that Fermat was wrong, but to understand why he seemed 
to obtain a correct result. 
6. As Di Martin0 notes, the reducibility of the Leibnizian principle to Fermat’s is borrowed by 
Jacquier and Le Seur. However, we think, it is only a formal homage, because he seems rather to 
paraphrase a well-known paragraph of Mairan on this argument [Mairan 1725, 3801. 
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